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A class action was instituted in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri by a shareholder against members
of an insurance company's Board of Directors. The complaint alleged
that the defendants had sold stock in excess of its fair market value
and that the shareholders of the company were entitled to the excess.
The jurisdiction of the court was invoked on the basis of diversity of
citizenship. Although the claim of the named class representative only
amounted to $8,740, the aggregate of claims of the potential class of
shareholders would approximate $1,200,000. The district court held
that the jurisdictional amount requirement was not met.' The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.2 A class action,
also based upon diversity of citizenship, was brought in the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas. The named class
member alleged damages of only $7.81 but contended that the amount
being sought by the entire class, persons who had been charged a
city tax although they resided outside of the city, would be in excess
of $10,000. An interlocutory appeal was taken from the district court's
denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to meet the minimum juris-
dictional amount. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the court's denial of that motion.' The Supreme Court
of the United States granted certiorari to resolve the conflict,4 con-
solidated the cases, and held: In a class action brought in the federal
courts, the separate claims of individual class members cannot be
aggregated in order to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement.
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
On July 1, 1966, an amended rule regulating the institution and
maintenance of class actions became effective. To both the bench and
the bar amended Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
offered not only hope for the orderly adjudication of claims in which
numerous individuals had a personal interest but also an end to the
nebulous categorization of claims under the old class action rule.' For
over a quarter of a century lawyers and judges had struggled with
the classification of any class action as "true," "hybrid," or "spurious."
1. Snyder v. Harris, 268 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Mo. 1967).
2. Snyder v. Harris, 390 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1968). The court of appeals relied upon
Alvarez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 827 (1967).
3. Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968).
4. Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn, 393 U.S. 911; Snyder v. Harris, 393 U.S. 911.
5. See generally Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 1204
(1966).
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The distinctions set forth in the old rule were of little assistance and
the developing case law obscured the classifications even further.
This was the climate into which amended Rule 23 was born. The
reason for the amendment of the Rule was to establish a practical
method for the redress of grievances, unhampered by the restrictive
categorization which had made equal access to justice available to
only some litigants.6
A split of opinion soon developed regarding the new Rule; some
lawyers regarded it as a pragmatic achievement, and others viewed it
as a constitutional infringement. Although there are aspects of the
Rule which may eventually require a declaration of either total or
partial unconstitutionality,7 the issue sub judice is not one of these
areas. Rather, the current decision restricts the entire class action
vehicle and prevents its application in many instances where it would
be most appropriate. The majority bottomed its holding upon five
bases: 1) the Court's own interpretation has traditionally been that
computation of the "matter in controversy" for jurisdictional purposes
precludes aggregation; 2) the interpretation of Rule 23 to permit ag-
gregation would violate Rule 82; 3) Congress, in re-enacting § 1332,8
impliedly agreed with the Court's prohibition against aggregation since
it never disapproved the doctrine; 4) the federal courts' workload is
too burdensome to accept a doctrine which would result in an increase
in the number of cases heard; and 5) permitting aggregation of claims
would result in the federal courts deciding many questions of state
law.9
The class action device has now been thwarted. Even with liberal
joinder rules, there is at present no practical way in which certain
controversies can be decided. The Court's reasoning that if aggrega-
tive claims were permitted in diversity cases many questions of state
law would be decided, is tortured at best. If this reasoning were valid,
then perhaps the grant of jurisdiction in diversity cases contained
within the Constitution" should be ignored as there is no compulsion
upon any branch of our government to exercise every grant of power
given to it. Moreover, the refusal to allow aggregative claims is more
far-reaching than merely in the area of federal jurisdiction based upon
diversity of citizenship. The effect of the decision will also be seen in
actions arising under § 1331 of Title 28 of the United States Code,
i.e., general federal question jurisdiction. The only basis for jurisdic-
6. See Advisory Committee's Note, Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure
for the United States District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 73, 98 (1966).
7. Specific reference is made to the binding effect of a judgment obtained by a class
of plaintiffs qualifying under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3). The doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel cannot be overlooked.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
9. However, the same result flows from the development of the entire body of conflicts
law.
10. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2.
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tion unaffected by the case noted herein is that involving a specific
federal question.
Thus many areas of developing law which lend themselves to use
of the class action device may be stunted in their growth due to the
instant decision. For example, there are many suits brought by and
on behalf of a corporation's stockholders against the corporate officers
or third persons." As a consequence, both the procedural class action
device and the substantive case law development in certain areas have
been hindered by the instant case.
The majority opinion relies heavily upon the supposed uncon-
stitutional expansion of federal jurisdiction which would result from
aggregative claims. However, both §§ 1331 and 1332 of Title 28,
United States Code, refer only to the "matter in controversy." No-
where is the phrase defined except by previous decisions of the Su-
preme Court of the United States. There can be no unconstitutional
basis for the determination of this sum unless the test used is contrary
to either the Constitution or laws of the United States. Which of these
would be violated if the amount were determined by the total sum
sought by the class rather than the sum sought by each plaintiff where
each has an individual claim? Indeed, the former method.is more in
harmony with the manner in which a Rule 23 class action proceeds
to adjudication, and the results would be more consistent so that future
litigants would have standards to guide them in the selection of a
judicial system. At present, since the "interest" of the plaintiff(s)
must now be defined, the courts and practicing attorneys will once
again have to wrestle with definitions which will either vary on a case-
by-case basis or become so complicated that understanding them will
become a specialized area of the law unto itself. As Mr. Justice Fortas
pointed out in his able and well-reasoned dissent:
This general aggregation rule, and its much later application
to class actions, rest entirely on judicial decisions, not on any
Act of Congress. There is certainly no reason the specific ap-
plication of this body of federal decisional law to class actions
should be immune from re-evaluation after a fundamental
change in the structure of federal class actions has made its
continuing application wholly anomalous.'
Through rather circuitous reasoning, the Court finds Congres-
sional approval of its holding in the instant case. The argument ap-
pears to be as follows: 1) this court has interpreted "matter in
controversy" as prohibitive of aggregation save in two joinder instances;
2) Congress has repeatedly re-enacted the two statutes containing this
11. E.g., Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), 249 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41
F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See also 22 U. MLrI L. RMv. 181 (1967).
12. 394 U.S. at 347-48.
1969]
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phrase; 3) in so doing, Congress has not questioned the judicial inter-
pretation; 4) Congress' silence is implicit approval of the doctrine;
and 5) thus, this court cannot modify or abrogate this interpretation
which has been approved by Congress (since it has not been dis-
approved). Accordingly, the Court visualizes an adoption by silence
and fails to even consider that Congressional policy may be not to
approve the interpretation and make it binding, but rather to achieve
a fluidity in case law by enacting general criteria and then allowing
the courts the freedom to initiate new doctrines and to modify or vi-
tiate unwieldy or impractical ones. The dissent herein reasoned that
[t]his case, far from being one in which there are "very
persuasive circumstances" indicating congressional adoption
of prior judicial doctrines, is one where only by the most
obvious fiction can congressional re-enactment of a general
statute be said to manifest an intention to adopt and perpet-
uate an existing technical judicial doctrine designated to facil-
itate administration of the statute.1
3
Moreover, Justice Fortas pointed out that when the 1958 congres-
sional re-enactment of §§ 1331 and 1332 increased the minimum juris-
dictional amount required, no mention of aggregation, or the other
doctrines which have been judicially conceived to define and deter-
mine the amount involved in the matter in controversy, was made in
either the hearings or the reports. 4
Furthermore, prior to the 1966 amendment of Rule 23 aggrega-
tive claims could be asserted in some instances, depending upon whether
the interest involved in the class action was common. As this test
provided no assistance but rather resulted in another developing area
of procedural case law, a practical amendment could have alleviated
confusion. The Rule in its amended form neither regulates nor pro-
fesses to involve the determination of federal jurisdiction. On the
other hand, it merely, for the first time, establishes a workable class
action device, a procedural tool. The only regulations contained within
the Rule itself are the standards for the maintenance of a class action
and the prerequisites for proceeding through litigation by using this
vehicle. In the instant case, the dissent recognized the limited effect
of the new Rule:
The decision that a class action is appropriate is not to be
taken lightly; the district court must consider the full range
of relevant factors specified in the Rule. However, whether
a claim is in traditional terms, "joint" or "several" no longer
has any necessary relevance to whether a class action is proper.
Thus, the amended Rule 23, which in the area of its operation
has the effect of statute, states a new method for determining
13. Id. at 349.
14. Id.
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when the common interests of many individuals can be as-
serted and resolved in a single litigation."
After it has been determined that a single action may be maintained
by a particular class, then a fortiori it is because the interest of the
class is common.
Once it is decided under the new Rule that an action may be
maintained as a class action, it is the claim of the whole class
and not the individual economic stakes of the separate members
of the class which is the "matter in controversy." That this is
so is perhaps most clearly indicated by the fact that the judg-
ment in a class action, properly maintained as such, includes all
members of the class. 6
In each of the consolidated cases, the individual plaintiffs had a
singular interest, i.e., the determination of the liability upon which each
individual claim rested; liability to one necessarily would mean liabil-
ity to all. Even in the former Rule 23 actions, these claims could have
been recognized by some courts as common, but by others as
several." Avoidance of this result-the intended purpose of the 1966
amended Rule 23-has been hindered, "[f]or the majority result will
continue to make determinative of the maintainability of a class action
just that obsolete conceptualism the amended Rule sought to make ir-
relevant."' 8
An additional result of the instant decision remains to be discussed.
In a class action meeting the requirements of Rule 23(b) (3), each
member of the alleged class is automatically bound by any determinations
made in the action unless he specifically requests to be excluded from
the class. Therefore, the following problem arises: If a class action were
brought wherein the named class representative(s) met the juris-
dictional amount requirement, each class member who did not request
exclusion would be bound by the judgment in that action although he
did not meet the minimum jurisdictional amount requirement and al-
though the Supreme Court of the United States has now held that his claim
may not be aggregated. Either unconstitutional implications must attach
or the Court has by its decision in the cases noted herein rendered ineffec-
tive this most practical and most-used provision of the class action Rule.' 9
One cannot refrain from wondering if the result of the possible negation
of section (b) (3) of Rule 23 will be that the current class action device
15. Id. at 352-53.
16. Id. at 353. This is, of course, only true in those actions maintained under FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
17. 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE fT 23.13 (2d ed. 1968) and 1968 Supp. are illustrative
of the discrepancies evolved.
18. 394 U.S. at 354.
19. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
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will become an unwieldy procedure which is appropriate in only limited
situations.20
The majority of the Court herein placed -great emphasis on the
restrictive mandate contained within Rule 82.21 Unfortunately, often-
times while interpreting procedural rules courts overlook the equally
strong mandate contained within Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: "[These Rules] shall be construed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action." As long as the develop-
ment of substantive law is not hampered, a workable procedural code
frequently requires a liberal construction. Although it was reversed by
the instant decision, the reasoning of the United State Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit is worthy of note:
It is true, of course, that the rule-making power does not in-
clude the right to create or abrogate substantive law and that
as a consequence no rule can lift or lower the $10,000 restric-
tion upon federal jurisdiction. But it has long been established
that the jurisdictional amount may be met by aggregation when
the matter in controversy is of the required value .... Rule 23
before or after amendment does not purport to affect this prin-
ciple.
22
The majority of the Court appears to overlook that the new class
action Rule is separate and distinct from its predecessor. Thus, in an
effort to achieve a smooth transition (rather than recognize a new cre-
ation), the Court seized upon what it apparently considered a close
analogy, to wit: joinder. It then proceeded to clearly, albeit erroneously,
apply the aggregation rules of that procedural device. Although the
foreseeable result of this reasoning is the stagnation of the class action,
this was perhaps the most tenable of the Court's arguments.
With the passage of amended Rule 23, the class action device ap-
peared to have an optimistic future. However, Professor Wright recently
expressed his fear that the development of the device could be short-lived.
The amended rule nowhere refers to a "joint" or a "common"
interest. It would be convenient if it should be held that, since
the judgment is binding under the amended rule on the entire
class, the claims for or against the whole class are in con-
troversy. This would be an entirely realistic view, and one en-
20. Adderly v. Wainwright, 46 F.R.D. 97 (M.D. Fla. 1968) (allowing use of the class
action in seeking a writ of habeas corpus). Contra, Hill v. Nelson, 272 F. Supp. 790, 794
(N.D. Cal. 1967), wherein the court stated:
We do not say that a class action for a writ of habeas corpus could never under
any circumstances be maintained but determine at this time that because of the
procedural problems inherent in this proceeding, use of such a class suit does not
appear the most practicable vehicle to determine the issues presented.
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 provides in part:
These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United
States district courts or the venue of actions therein.
22. Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831, 834 (10th Cir. 1968).
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tirely consonant with the stated purpose of the amount in
controversy requirement, to avoid having the federal courts
"fritter away their time in the trial of petty controversies."
A good deal of ancient learning will have to be forgotten, how-
ever, if this practical and sensible result is to be reached.2"
Strangely enough, Mr. Justice Black, who delivered the opinion of the
Court in the decisions under consideration, once expressed his own ap-
prehension that the Rules might be restrained from reaching their full
workability and indeed prophesied the result of the instant decision.
In a dissenting opinion he wrote:
It does no good to have liberalizing rules like 60(b) if, after
they are written, their arteries are hardened by this Court's
resort to ancient common-law concepts.24
LINDA M. RIGOT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVATE POSSESSION OF
OBSCENE FILMS WHERE THERE IS NO INTENT
TO SELL, CIRCULATE, OR DISTRIBUTE
After spending nearly an hour viewing three eight-millimeter films
of "nude men and women engaged in sexual intercourse and sodomy,'
which had been unearthed during a search of the appellant's home for
gambling paraphernalia under the aegis of a search warrant, police offi-
cers arrested the appellant for possession of material which he knew to be
obscene, in violation of Georgia law.2 Defendant's conviction by a jury
23. 2 BARRON & HOLTZoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 569 (Supp. 1968)
(Wright ed. 1961).
24. Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 205 (1950).
1. Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 251, 252, 161 S.E.2d 309, 319 (1968).
2. Any person who shall knowingly bring or cause to be brought into this State for
sale or exhibition, or who shall knowingly sell or offer to sell, or who shall know-
ingly lend or give away or offer to lend or give away, or who shall knowingly have
possession of, or who shall knowingly exhibit or transmit to another, any obscene
matter, or who shall knowingly advertise for sale by any form of notice printed,
written, or verbal, any obscene matter, or who shall knowingly manufacture, draw,
duplicate or print any obscene matter with intent to sell, expose or circulate the
same, shall, if such person has knowledge or reasonably should know of the obscene
nature of such matter, be guilty of a felony . . . . As used herein, a matter is
obscene if, considered as a whole, applying contemporary community standards,
its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest
in nudity, sex or excretion. (Emphasis added.)
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1968).
Under FLA. STAT. § 847.011(1) (a) (1967), it is a felony to possess obscene materials
with the intent to sell, distribute, etc. However, under FLA. STAT. § 847.011(2) (1967), mere
possession of obscene matter is a misdemeanor:
A person who knowingly has in his possession, custody, or control any obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, immoral, sadistic, or masochistic book, magazine,
